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Bottom-Up or Top-
Down? Campbell’s
Rationalist Account
of Monothematic
Delusions
Tim Bayne and
Elisabeth Pacherie
ABSTRACT: A popular approach to monothematic delu-
sions in the recent literature has been to argue that
monothematic delusions involve broadly rational re-
sponses to highly unusual experiences. Campbell
(2001) calls this the empiricist approach to monothe-
matic delusions, and argues that it cannot account for
the links between meaning and rationality. In place of
empiricism, Campbell offers a rationalist account of
monothematic delusions, according to which delu-
sional beliefs are understood as Wittgensteinian frame-
work propositions. We argue that neither Campbell’s
attack on empiricism nor his rationalist alternative to
empiricism is successful.
KEYWORDS: monothematic delusions, rationality, mean-
ing, rationalism, empiricism
S OME OTHERWISE RATIONAL PEOPLE appear tobelieve strange things. Sometimes peoplebelieve that someone, usually a near rela-
tive or member of their family—often their
spouse—has been replaced by an impostor. Some-
times people believe that they are dead. These
two delusions—known as the Capgras and Co-
tard delusions, respectively—are instances of
monothematic delusions, because they are limit-
ed to very specific topics. Other monothematic
delusions involve the delusion that one is being
followed by known people in disguise (the Frégoli
delusion) or that the person one sees in the mir-
ror is someone else (mirrored-self misidentifica-
tion). We focus on the Capgras delusion in our
discussion.
Delusions raise many issues of interest for
philosophical psychology. Central among these
issues is the question of what kind of mental
states they are. One view—endorsed by Jaspers
(1963) and more recently by Berrios (1991) and
Sass (1994)—holds that, despite appearances to
the contrary, delusions are not contentful states.
This view is sometimes called the expressivist
(Gerrans 2001) or non-assertoric (Young 1999)
account. On a second account of delusions, de-
veloped recently by Currie and collaborators (Cur-
rie 2000; Currie and Jureidini 2001; Currie and
Ravenscroft 2002), delusions are cognitive hal-
lucinations: they are imaginative states that are
misidentified by their subjects as beliefs. It’s not
clear whether Currie and co-authors wish to ex-
tend their account to monothematic delusions,
but it certainly could be so extended.1
Although the expressivist and “cognitive hal-
lucination” accounts of delusions are important,
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we set them aside here. Instead, we focus on a
dispute between two doxastic accounts of mono-
thematic delusions—that is, accounts that hold
delusions to be beliefs of a certain kind. The first
account holds that monothematic delusions are
beliefs that are broadly rational responses to
highly unusual experiences. Following Campbell
(2001), we will call this the empiricist approach
to monothematic delusions. Some versions of
empiricism hold that the only deficit the patient
suffers from is an unusual experience, and that
the delusional belief is a completely rational re-
sponse to the patient’s experience (Maher 1999).
More common in the recent literature are two-
factor versions of empiricism, in which mono-
thematic delusions involve an unusual experi-
ence plus a reasoning bias or deficit of some kind
(Davies and Coltheart 2000; Davies et al. 2001;
Ellis and Young 1990; Stone and Young 1997;
Young 2000). Both versions of empiricism are
united in regarding the delusional patient as
broadly rational.
The second model we examine is that offered
by John Campbell (2001). Campbell argues that
empiricist accounts of monothematic delusions
face serious objections, and in their place offers
what he calls a rationalist account, according to
which delusions are understood as Wittgenstein-
ian framework propositions: the Capgras pa-
tient’s assertion that his wife has been replaced
by an impostor expresses a belief, but the belief
that it expresses does not have the same content
as the belief that I would express were I to assert
that the patient’s wife had been replaced by an
impostor. In this paper, we argue that neither
Campbell’s attack on empiricism nor his ratio-
nalist alternative to empiricism is successful.
Problems With Empiricism
Empiricist accounts of monothematic delu-
sions are committed to the following three claims:
(1)Bottom-up etiology thesis: The proximal cause
of the delusional belief is a certain highly un-
usual experience.
(2)Rationality thesis: The delusional belief is a
broadly rational response to the patient’s un-
usual experience.
(3)Preservation of meaning thesis: The terms the
deluded subject uses to express the delusional
beliefs retain their usual meaning.
There are various ways in which one might
relate these three components, but one plausible
story is this. (We tell this story as it applies to the
Capgras delusion, but one could attempt to tell
similar stories for other monothematic delusions.)
One begins with Ellis and Young’s two-compo-
nent model of face recognition, initially devel-
oped to account for prosopagnosia (Ellis and
Young 1990). On this model, face recognition
involves two information-processing pathways:
a visuo-semantic pathway that constructs a visu-
al image that encodes semantic information about
facial features, and a visuo-affective pathway
that produces a specific affective response to
familiar faces (the feeling of familiarity). In
prosopagnosia, the visuo-semantic pathway is
damaged, which accounts for the patient’s in-
ability to recognize faces, whereas the visuo-
affective pathway remains intact, which explains
why they retain covert recognition of familiar
faces.2 Ellis and Young proposed that Capgras
might be a mirror image of prosopagnosia, with
the affective pathway damaged but the visuo-
semantic pathway intact. The belief that a close
relative has been replaced by an impostor would
be a response to their unusual experiences of
their spouse’s face: one’s spouse is recognized as
looking like one’s spouse, but the normal feeling
of familiarity is absent (and, indeed, a feeling of
unfamiliarity is present). So, (1) has some sup-
port.3
Second, one might think that (1) supports (2).
There are two ways in which the connection
between (1) and (2) might be developed (see
Davies et al. 2001). On the one hand, it might be
that the patient’s experience has content that
directly warrants the delusional belief. On this
model, the content of the Capgras patient’s visu-
al perception of their spouse is roughly, “The
woman I am looking at is not my wife.” The
transition from this experience to the patient’s
delusional belief is akin to the transition from a
visual experience that, say, there is a dog in front
of one, to the belief that there is a dog in front of
one: there might not be a perfect match between
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the content of the perceptual state and that of the
doxastic state—perhaps the former has noncon-
ceptual content and the latter conceptual con-
tent—but there will be a fairly intimate relation-
ship between the two. We call this the
endorsement model, on the grounds that adopt-
ing the delusional belief involves doxastically
endorsing the content of the delusional percep-
tion. On the other hand, it might be that the
content of the Capgras patient’s experience is
less rich, and may not be about their spouse at
all; perhaps it involves nothing more than a
strange feeling, which happens to be correlated
with looking at one’s spouse. On this model, the
patient adopts the delusional belief in an attempt
to explain why he has this unusual experience
whenever he looks at his spouse. At some level he
thinks to himself, “The reason why I have this
strange experience whenever I look at this per-
son is because she is an impostor.” On this expla-
nationist version of the two-factor model, there
is less pressure to think of the patient’s perceptu-
al experience as encoding the content of the
Capgras delusion.
Finally, (2) may be thought to support (3).
Insofar as the delusional belief is supported by
the person’s experiences—either directly or by
way of abductive (explanatory) inference—it is
possible to preserve a literal interpretation of his
words. Indeed, Stone and Young take this to be
an important advantage of the empiricist ac-
count, claiming that “It has been the burden of
our explanation of the Capgras delusion to see it
as an understandable (i.e. sense-making) inter-
pretation of a perceptual deficit” (1997, 357).
Proponents of two-factor versions of empiricism
agree that delusional patients are not completely
or fully rational—they recognize that deluded
patients are not always responsive to tensions
between their delusional belief and their other
beliefs in the ways in which a rational person
should be—but they deny that these departures
from the norms of rationality are serious enough
to undermine the preservation of meaning thesis.
On our reading of his position, Campbell re-
jects (1), (2), and (3). On his view, monothematic
delusions are neither caused nor justified by un-
usual experiences, and the terms in which the
patient expresses his belief do not retain their
usual meaning. Campbell motivates his position
by arguing that the empiricist model that we’ve
just outlined fails. So, the first order of business
is to examine Campbell’s criticisms of empiri-
cism. In the second half of this paper we turn the
critical spotlight on Campbell’s own account. We
begin with (1): the bottom-up etiology thesis.
Campbell’s first worry here is that the mere
lack of affect in the perception of a woman does
not itself constitute the perception’s having a
particular content, let alone the content “that
[perceived] woman is not that [remembered]
woman” (2001, 96). According to Campbell, it
is doubtful whether an experience could have
this content without top-down loading by the
patient, where by top-down loading he seems to
mean that the perceptual state inherits its con-
tent from belief. But if we need to appeal to top-
down loading then the empiricist game is over,
because the empiricist could not appeal to the
content of the patient’s perceptual or affective
states to explain why they form the delusional
belief.
Let us start with the claim that the mere lack
of affect in the perception of the patient’s wife
could not itself constitute the perception’s having
a particular content. We think that this is right:
one should not confuse the lack of experience
with the experience of a lack. But we also think
that the lack of affect can very easily generate the
experience of a lack of affect. Here it may be
useful to draw a parallel with the experience of
patients with cerebral achromatopsia, the loss of
color vision as a result of damage to the extras-
triate cortex. Cerebral achromatopsia is interest-
ing in at least three respects. First, persons who
develop cerebral achromatopsia report that they
see a monochromatic world, all in shades of
gray. It would be wrong (or at least misleading)
to say that their visual experience differs from
the visual experience of subjects with normal
color vision only in that it lacks the experience of
color. Rather, the visual experience of these pa-
tients has the content that color shades have
been replaced by shades of gray. Second, these
subjects are perfectly aware that their visual ex-
perience of the world is different from what it
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was before the onset of their condition. Third,
given that these subjects are also very often un-
able to imagine or remember colors (Farah 1988),
their awareness of their deficit is not based on a
comparison of their present experience with con-
sciously recollected experiences of colors. Rather
it seems to be based on meta-memory.4 Similarly,
we suggest, Capgras patients do not merely fail
to experience the affect of familiarity when see-
ing their loved ones; rather, the normal feeling of
familiarity has been replaced by a disturbing
feeling of unfamiliarity and estrangement.
There is, however, an important difference
between the Capgras delusion and achromatop-
sia: whereas the patient with achromatopsia is
aware of the particular perceptual attributes that
she has lost, the Capgras patient is unable to
articulate precisely what it is that is different
about his experience. Nevertheless, Capgras pa-
tients seem to realize that something has changed
in the nature of their experiences, because they
often refer to the content of their experiences to
justify their delusional beliefs. One Capgras pa-
tient remarked, “there’s someone like my son’s
double which isn’t my son. I can tell my son
because my son’s different but you have to be
quick to notice it” (Young et al. 1993, 696; see
also Merrin and Silberfarb 1976). The same point
is true of patients with the Cotard delusion:
“What the [Cotard] patients often give as evi-
dence of their non-existence or death is that they
don’t have proper feelings” (Young and Leaf-
head 1996, 149).
Campbell could concede this point and yet
maintain that an experience could have the con-
tent “I have a strange feeling of unfamiliarity
now” without having the content “This [per-
ceived] woman is not that [remembered] wom-
an.” Moreover, he might claim that a visual ex-
perience could not have that content without
top-down loading. At this point, Campbell might
refer us to the patient who looked at a row of
empty marble tables and had the delusion that
the world was about to end. As he points out, it
is difficult to see how a person could have the
experience with the content that the world was
about to end without top-down loading (2001,
96). Similarly, one might argue that one could
not have an experience with the content that a
perceived person is not a remembered person
without top-down loading, because the concepts
involved in this experience are not sensory.
There are two issues to consider here. The
first is whether the two-factor theorist needs to
accept Campbell’s characterization of the deluded
patient’s perceptual state. The second issue is wheth-
er Campbell is right to think that a perceptual
state could not acquire that content without top-
down loading. We tackle these questions in turn.
A proponent of what we called the explana-
tionist version of the two-factor model need not
accept that the patient’s perception has the con-
tent “This [perceived] woman is not that [re-
membered] woman.” Such models think of the
content of the patient’s perception as being much
poorer, something like, “this person looks a bit
strange.” On this view, the two-factor theorist
does not need to explain how the patient’s visual
experience could have nonsensory content, be-
cause according to her it does not. This is not to
say that the explanationist line is unproblemat-
ic—one might well put pressure on the rationali-
ty of the patient’s abductive inference—but it
does not face this problem. (The explanationist
has a hard job explaining why the patient makes
the particular abductive inference she does, but
she has less difficulty giving an account of the
content of the patient’s perceptual state. The
proponent of the endorsement account has pre-
cisely the opposite problem: her problem is ex-
plaining how the patient’s perceptual experience
could acquire the content of the Capgras delu-
sion.)
The fact that the explanationist can block
Campbell’s first objection is of little comfort to
us, because we are not much tempted by the
explanationist version of the two-factor account.
Instead, we prefer the endorsement version of
the two-factor approach, according to which the
patient’s visual perception has the content “This
[perceived] woman is not the person who I think
of as my wife,” or something very close to this.
So we need to explain how a perceptual state
could have this content without inheriting it from
the belief that the person one is looking at is not
the person one remembers as one’s wife.
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The central issue here is how the Capgras
patient thinks of his spouse. One possibility would
be that he thinks of his wife as “whoever it is that
produces that affective response in me.” Camp-
bell rejects this proposal on the grounds that
“that it is not, actually, how we ordinarily think
of our spouses. We do, in fact, tend to think in
terms of our memories of them” (2001, 92). It is
clear, moreover, that what he has in mind are
propositionally articulable episodic memories of
past episodes in one’s common life. We think
that Campbell may be overemphasizing the im-
portance of propositionally articulable episodic
memories here and underestimating the role of
affective memory. The delusions of Capgras pa-
tients primarily concern close relatives, loved
ones. We may well spend more time in the course
of our life with colleagues than with our family
and share with those colleagues as many episodic
memories as we do with our relatives. Colleagues
may be as familiar as relatives in this sense. Yet,
however much we like our colleagues, our affec-
tive ties to close relatives are normally much
stronger. It may be true that the way we think of
other people generally is not in terms of the
affective response they produce in us, but affect
seems to play an essential role in the way we
think of our relatives. One normally thinks of
one’s spouse as this person one loves (or hates in
unhappy relationships). When we think of them
in terms of the memories we have of them, the
episodic memories that come to mind tend to be
memories of emotionally significant episodes,
namely, episodes where your emotional response
to your spouse or hers to you played an important
role, and episodes where your shared emotional
responses to some third object reinforced your
emotional ties to one another. Episodic memories
may be important to how we think of our spouse
not so much in themselves but insofar as they func-
tion as cues for the recall of affective memories.
Campbell’s suspicion that the experience of the
Capgras patients could not have the content “This
[perceived] woman is not that [remembered] wom-
an” may be unfounded if, as we propose, memories
of relatives are typically deeply affect-laden.
Perhaps Campbell’s worry is that reference to
particular individuals cannot enter into percep-
tual content. This worry—which might not be
Campbell’s—also seems to be unfounded. Sup-
pose that you know two identical twins: Jules
and Jim. You can tell Jules and Jim apart just by
looking at them, but you have no idea how you
do this. The algorithm that one’s face-processing
system uses to discriminate Jules from Jim is not
available to introspection. Still, it is clear that
you can do this. Looking at Jules you say to
yourself, “That is Jules,” and this judgment is
warranted by the fact that it is part of the content
of one’s perceptual state that the object of one’s
current perception is Jules (and not just someone
who is qualitatively indiscernible from Jules).
We turn now to what we take to be Camp-
bell’s second and third objections to empiricism.
Campbell holds that the empiricist account fails
to appreciate the strength of the link between
rationality and meaning. Following Quine’s lead,
Campbell argues that there is a constitutive link
between one’s knowledge of the meaning of a
term or concept and one’s use of the term or
concept in reasoning. More precisely, his claim is
that the use one makes of a term or concept in
reasoning must be systematically causally depen-
dent on the meaning we associate with it. Given
this constitutive link, if the use one makes of a
term in reasoning is sufficiently unlike the ca-
nonical use of this term, it becomes questionable
whether one really grasps its meaning.
Campbell claims that even if the patient has an
experience with the content “This [perceived] wom-
an is not that [remembered] woman,” forming
the belief that this perceived woman is not that
remembered woman is not rational. The patient
should also take his other beliefs (and experiences)
into account when moving from the experience to
the belief; in short, he should verify the judgment.
How would you go about verifying such a judgment?
You would have to check that the woman you cur-
rently perceive is indeed the one of whom you have all
those memories. The canonical way to do this would
be to find out whether you have shared memories of
the events in which you both took part. And the
canonical way to do that would be to discuss those
past events. It is not that your memories have to
coincide at all points or even that they have to be
correct memories, but that they recognizably derive
from the same episodes. Since the patient does not use
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this way of checking who it is that is before him, he
seems to have lost his grip on the meaning of the word
(Campbell 2001, 90–91).
Because the delusional patient seems to have lost
his grip on the meaning of the words he uses, we
lack any precise way of characterizing the con-
tent of his delusion. He says, “My wife has been
replaced by an impostor,” but we are prevented
from ascribing the corresponding belief to him.
Campbell has raised an important challenge
for empiricist accounts, and there is much that
needs to be said here. In what follows, we sketch
some of the reasons for finding Campbell’s argu-
ment problematic.
First, if, as we propose, memories of relatives
are typically deeply affect-laden, then one canon-
ical way of verifying that the person you current-
ly perceive is not your wife would be to check
whether the feeling of unfamiliarity persists over
time and accompanies all your episodes of seeing
that person. Thus, the recurring character of the
experience of unfamiliarity—which we assume
characterizes the Capgras syndrome—may be tak-
en as evidence that the judgment is correct.
Second, Campbell conflates—or at least fails
to clearly distinguish—two reasons why Capgras
patients might fail to engage in canonical ways
of verifying their judgments. One possibility is
that they lack the required inferential compe-
tence: they have no idea what the canonical pro-
cedures of verification in question are. This seems
to be the position that Campbell takes. A second
possibility is that, although they have the requi-
site competence, they are unwilling to employ it.
There may be two reasons for this unwillingness.
The first has to do with questions of context:
canonical procedures of verification are only ca-
nonical relative to normal, or canonical, con-
texts, where they are likely to succeed. One may
not be inclined to engage in canonical proce-
dures if one thinks the context is not canonical.
Capgras patients tend to be of a suspicious cast
of mind and often have paranoid or persecutory
tendencies. This may explain not only why they
assign a high initial probability to the hypothesis
that their spouse has been replaced by an impos-
tor, but also why they do not use canonical veri-
fication procedures to check it. If you are strong-
ly inclined to believe that the person you are
talking to is an impostor, you might think that
there is little point in talking to them, for they
are unlikely to be cooperative and are probably
intent on deceiving you. Furthermore, if you think
that the impostor is a full doppelganger of your
wife, then you might think that checking her
memories would be pointless, for a full doppel-
ganger of your wife will share her memories. In
short, it is not at all clear that the Capgras
patient would consider that the verification pro-
cedures that Campbell demands are appropriate
to the context at hand.
The second reason why Capgras patients might
be unwilling to engage in such verification proce-
dures has to do with motivation. On an empiri-
cist account, a motivational deficit would not be
surprising given that the root of the patients’
impairment is affective. Their problem would
then be one of inferential motivation rather than
inferential competence.
Third, Campbell’s canonical verification pro-
cedures have to do with theoretical reasoning,
but theoretical reasoning is only one possible
manifestation of one’s grasp of the meaning of
terms. Engaging in practical reasoning seems
equally important. And although patients with
monothematic delusions display an often sur-
prising lack of delusional-generated activity, it
would not be correct to say that Capgras pa-
tients do not engage in any such behavior. Capgras
patients do act on the basis of their beliefs, some-
times violently (de Pauw and Szulecka 1988). A
recent view of 260 Capgras cases found violence
in 18% (Förstl et al. 1991). One such patient
accused his stepfather of being a robot and de-
capitated him to look for the batteries in his head
(Blount 1986). Other Capgras patients have
lodged complaints with the police for the abduc-
tion of their spouse. As Young (1999) notes, this
is a pretty good indication that their claims should
be taken literally. And in their analysis of Co-
tard’s original case reports, Young and Leafhead
(1996) note that all of Cotard’s patients showed
some form of delusion-related behavior (e.g., re-
fusing to eat, move, or defecate).
Finally, at least some Capgras patients seem to
be aware of how implausible their claims may
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sound to others. Consider the following well-
known exchange:
E: Isn’t that [two families] unusual?
S: It was unbelievable.
E: How do you account for it?
S: I don’t know. I have tried to understand it myself
and it was virtually impossible.
S: What if I told you I don’t believe it?
E: That’s perfectly understandable. In fact, when I tell
the story, I feel that I’m concocting a story . . . it’s not
quite right, something is wrong.
E: If someone told you the story what would you
think?
S: I would find it extremely hard to believe. I should
be defending myself. (Alexander, Stuss, and Benson
1979, 335)
It is difficult to see how the Capgras patient
might grasp the fact that others find it difficult to
believe their story if they have lost their grip on
the meaning of the terms they use.
Although we admit that delusional patients
are less than fully rational—and that these fail-
ures of rationality present a challenge for empir-
icists’ accounts—we remain unconvinced that
these failures are drastic enough to warrant the
claim that the delusional patients have lost their
grip on the meaning of the terms in which they
frame their delusion.
Campbell’s Solution:
Delusional Beliefs as
Framework Propositions
We turn now to Campbell’s rationalist alter-
native to empiricism. There are two central ques-
tions here: (1) what exactly does the rationalist
account involve? and (2) does it provide a better
explanation or characterization of monothemat-
ic delusions than empiricism?
Campbell’s account involves two components
that we think it useful to distinguish and treat
separately. The first component is etiological:
monothematic delusions involve a “top-down
disturbance in some fundamental beliefs of the
subject, which may consequently affect experi-
ences and actions” (2001, 89). The second com-
ponent is the idea that delusions can be usefully
regarded as Wittgensteinian framework proposi-
tions. Campbell suggests that “My spouse has
been replaced by an impostor” has, for the
Capgras patient, the kind of status that, accord-
ing to Wittgenstein, “There are a lot of objects in
the world,” “the world has existed for quite a
long time,” and “there are some chairs and ta-
bles in this room” have for most of us. What
exactly that status amounts to is somewhat un-
clear, but it seems to involve the idea of immuni-
ty to ordinary empirical scrutiny. As far as we
can see, the two components of Campbell’s ac-
count are logically independent. On the one hand,
a belief can function as a framework proposition
without being top-down: presumably “there are
some chairs and tables in this room” is such a
belief. And on the other hand, a belief can be
top-down without being framework. A belief
could arise as a direct result of organic malfunc-
tion without being immune to ordinary empiri-
cal scrutiny. We will examine the claim that delu-
sions are framework propositions in the second
half of this section; for now we focus on the
etiological component of Campbell’s position.
There are a number of things that one might
mean by describing delusional beliefs as top-
down. What Campbell means is that delusional
beliefs are neither caused nor justified by unusu-
al experiences.5 But Campbell does not think
that delusional beliefs are inferred from other
beliefs. Instead, he suggests that they arise as a
direct result of organic malfunction (2001, 97).6
Campbell notes that there seems to be a sense
in which it is easier to explain a change in experi-
ence as a direct result of organic malfunction
than it is to explain a change in belief as a direct
result of organic malfunction (see also Davies
and Coltheart 2000, 8). The reasons for this
sense of unease are not clear; it might, perhaps,
have something to do with the holism of belief as
opposed to the (relative) encapsulation of per-
ception, and it might have something to do with
the notion that we have more control over the
formation of beliefs that we do over the forma-
tion of perceptual states. But whatever its cause,
its not clear that it is justified. It is widely grant-
ed that there are emotional routes to belief: be-
liefs can be generated and maintained by the
emotional functions they serve. And it certainly
seems conceivable that certain beliefs (and not
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just concepts) might be innate. Indeed, some theists
have claimed precisely this, and similar ideas have
been suggested in cognitive science regarding vari-
ous folk domains, such as folk physics and folk
biology. If these nonevidential routes to belief are
possible, there seems little reason to rule out the
rationalist conception of belief formation a priori.
But given his earlier objections to empiricism
it is rather puzzling to find Campbell endorsing
the rationalist account of belief formation. Camp-
bell claims that the empiricist fails to secure the
rationality of belief acquisition in the Capgras
patient, because the content of their experience
does not justify the belief. But on Campbell’s
own account the Capgras patient does not have
any reasons—not even poor reasons—for his de-
lusional belief! One might think that acquiring
and maintaining a belief without any reasons is
more irrational than acquiring and maintaining
it for poor reasons.7
A further problem for Campbell is that of
explaining why monothematic delusions cluster
around particular topics. If delusions arise di-
rectly from brain damage why do we not find as
many delusional topics as there are possible be-
liefs? Why, for example, do we not find delusion-
al patients who believe that, say, their fridge
magnets have been replaced by impostors, or
that dogs like Opera, or whatever. Of course,
monothematic delusions do not have quite the
monothematicity that they are often presented as
having—there are cases of delusional misidentifi-
cation for nonhuman animals (Ramachandran
and Blakeslee 1998) and inanimate objects (Abed
and Fewtrell 1990; Anderson 1988; Castillo and
Berman 1994; Christodoulou 1977; Green 1989;
Rastogi 1990)—but such cases are noticeably
less common than delusions of misidentification
for close family members. Furthermore, even these
nonstandard misidentification delusions fall into
a certain category: they involve familiar and emo-
tionally significant animals and objects (although,
see Ball and Exworthy 1990). On the rationalist
account of delusion formation, it is quite unclear
why there should be any clustering in the con-
tents of monothematic delusions.
We are also puzzled by the question of how a
top-down account of delusions could explain the
damage to the autonomic system that one finds
in the Capgras and Cotard delusions. Is this
caused by the delusional belief? That seems un-
likely.8
We turn now to the claim that delusional
beliefs are framework propositions. Unfortunate-
ly, Campbell is none too clear about what exact-
ly a framework proposition is, but the notion
seems to have both epistemic and semantic con-
tent. Framework propositions have a privileged
epistemic status: “they are not themselves, in any
ordinary way, subject to empirical scrutiny”
(2001, 96f). Second, the notion of a framework
belief has semantic implications: “Wittgenstein’s
notion of a framework proposition was never
worked out in great detail. But it is certainly part
of the picture here that a change in framework
principles would bring with it a change in the
meanings of the terms used” (2001, 98). Camp-
bell seems to think these epistemic and semantic
points are closely related. We are skeptical of this
claim—surely the belief that God exists could be
framework for one person without being frame-
work for another—but we will grant it here. The
issues on which we wish to focus are whether
delusions really are immune to ordinary empiri-
cal scrutiny, and whether the meaning of the
patient’s words has changed.
Are monothematic delusions “immune to or-
dinary empirical scrutiny?” They are certainly
very resistant to counterevidence, and in this
respect they function as framework propositions.
One of the very puzzling features of delusions is
that patients often revise their background be-
liefs rather than their delusions when forced to
confront inconsistencies between the two. Con-
sider the following report of a conversation be-
tween JK, a Cotard patient, and Young and Leaf-
head.
We asked her during the period in which she claimed
to be dead whether she could feel her heart beat,
whether she could feel hot or cold and whether she
could feel whether her bladder was full. JK said that
since she had such feelings even though she was dead
they clearly did not represent evidence that she was
alive. (Young and Leafhead 1996, 158).
JK is obviously not indifferent to the tension
between her delusional state and her background
11.1bayne01. 3/15/04, 8:48 AM8
BAYNE AND PACHERIE / MONOTHEMATIC DELUSIONS ■ 9
beliefs (which, incidentally, suggests that she has
not lost her grip on the meanings of the words
she uses), but rather than retain her background
beliefs concerning the marks of being alive, she
retains the delusion that she is dead. So in this
respect her delusion functions as a framework
belief.
But the story is not quite so simple, because
deluded patients often appreciate the implausi-
bility of their beliefs. “If you ask ‘What would
you think if I told you that my wife has been
replaced by an impostor?,’ you will often get
answers to the effect that it would be unbeliev-
able, absurd, an indication that you had gone
mad” (Young 1998, 37). If the Capgras patient
really does regard his delusional beliefs as frame-
work, then why is he puzzled by the thought that
other people might share his belief? After all, do
we not assume that what is framework for us
will normally also be framework for other peo-
ple? Of course, there are situations in which we
do not make this assumption: the person who
has undergone a religious conversion need not
have forgotten about his earlier outlook on the
world and may have no difficulty understanding
that other people do not share his views. But if
you asked such a person what they would think
if you also believed what they believed, you would
not expect to be told that it would be “unbeliev-
able, absurd, an indication that you had gone
mad.”
A second objection to the framework propos-
al is that the delusions are often quite encapsu-
lated. One would expect framework beliefs to
play a pivotal role in structuring the patient’s
thought and action. The ability of a delusional
belief to function as a framework proposition is
dependent, one might think, on it being integrat-
ed into the patient’s practical and theoretical
behavior. But although delusional patients some-
times act on their beliefs, this belief-related be-
havior is far from systematic.
We turn, finally, to the semantic component of
Campbell’s position. Campbell’s idea here, we
take it, is that understanding delusional beliefs as
framework propositions is the only way to pre-
serve the constitutive links between meaning and
rationality. (Note that it need not be any part of
Campbell’s position that the delusional patient is
fully rational; after all, there seems to be some-
thing paradigmatically irrational in taking the
content of the delusional belief as a framework
proposition.) Capgras patients fail to engage in
the canonical behavior that is bound up with the
belief that one’s spouse has been replaced by an
impostor because this is not what they believe.
Campbell says that “The really key question
about the deluded subject is how the use that she
makes of the terms in which she frames her
delusion relates to her knowledge of the mean-
ings of the terms” (2001, 95). Fair enough. But
what is Campbell’s answer to this question? Has
the patient completely lost her grip on the mean-
ings of the terms involved (wife, this woman,
etc.), or has she lost her grip on them only in the
context of framing her delusion? We are not sure
what Campbell’s position is here, but we think
he adopts the latter position. That would seem to
be the better position for a rationalist to take.
The Capgras patient seems to know what wife,
this woman, and so on mean. He might be happy
to identify his wife as his wife when talking to
her on the telephone, and in such contexts his
use of the relevant terms would seem to be per-
fectly standard. But why should the patient lose
his grip on the meanings of the words only in the
context of delusional utterances? Is it really plau-
sible that one’s grip on the meaning of a term
could be context sensitive in this manner? We
find that hard to believe. Indeed, we find it hard
to believe that Campbell believes it, as it seems to
run counter the meaning holism that he invokes
in support of the view that delusions are frame-
work beliefs.
What does the Capgras patients believe if not
that his wife has been replaced by an impostor?
What does the patient mean by “This woman is
not my wife,” if not that the woman he is look-
ing at is not the same person as the woman he
has memories of being married to? It is not at all
clear that a better interpretation of the patient’s
utterance is available. Note the contrast between
this case and the case that Campbell uses to
motivate the claim that there is a constitutive
link between rationality and meaning. Campbell
presents a case in which a confused tourist says
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to you “The Statue of Liberty has a rather crowd-
ed location in the middle of Trafalgar square in
London, but anyone would have to admire the
lions at its base; such a statue could only be
English.” As he rightly says, everything falls into
place when one realizes that the person means to
be referring to Nelson’s column by “the Statue of
Liberty.” But the rhetorical force of this example
is misplaced, for it does not transfer to the
Capgras patient. As far as we can see, there is no
other translation of what the Capgras patient
says according to which everything falls into
place. Describing the Capgras patient’s belief as
a framework proposition fails to advance our
understanding of what he believes or why he
believes it.
Wittgenstein once said that if lions could talk
we would not understand them. Campbell’s view
seems to be that although delusional patients can
talk, we cannot understand them. What is curi-
ous is that they seem to be able to understand us.
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Notes
1. See Bayne and Pacherie (forthcoming) for a criti-
cal discussion of Currie’s account of delusions.
2. Note that prosopagnosia is not quite the mirror
image of Capgras syndrome, for prosopagnosics have
lost the conscious (overt) feeling of familiarity towards
familiar faces.
3. Note that on this account one might expect
patients with the Capgras delusion to also suffer from
the delusion of subjective doubles (the belief that dupli-
cates of you exist), or at least mirrored self-misidentifi-
cation (mistaking one’s image in the mirror for another
person), for presumably the Capgras patient would not
have the normal experience of familiarity on looking at
his own face in the mirror. In fact, Capgras delusion
and the delusion of subjective doubles are frequently
associated (Weinstein, 1996); indeed, one of Capgras’
original patients also experienced the delusion of sub-
jective doubles.
4. A typical instance of meta-memory would be
your knowing that you know the name of a certain
person and knowing her name is not, say, Jones, while
at the same time being unable to retrieve it.
5. One could also hold a top-down account on
which the experience is importantly influenced by atti-
tudes and attributional styles, rather than beliefs as
such. See, for example, Garety, 1991; Garety and Free-
man, 2000; Kaney and Bentall, 1989).
6. Note that Campbell need not—and probably
should not—be read as thinking of the relationship
between the brain damage and the belief as causal. The
particular way in which a rationalist conceives of this
relation will depend on their metaphysics of mental
states; one could think of this relationship in terms of
supervenience rather than causation.
7. This claim raises a number of tricky issues. For
example, it supposes that we have an account of what
it is to have a reason for a belief. There is much that
could be said, but we lack the space to pursue these
issues here.
8. We thank Max Coltheart for this point.
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